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Abstract  workable  competition.  Under  this  aegis,  three
courts have seized upon market share as  a basis The  judiciary  has  relied  on  a  firm's  market
for evaluating  the  presence  of actual  monop- share  to  evaluate  the  presence  of  monopoly  ealatin  te prese o  a  l 
power  for  a  Sherman  Act  monopolization  vio-  olzaton,  a  conspiracy  to  monopolize  (Alex-
ander v. National  Farmers  Organization), and lation. However,  an allegation that a firm's mar- 
an  attempt  to  monopolize  (United States  v. ket share  constitutes  monopoly  power  may be  an  attempt  to  monopolize  (United States  v.
refuted  by  evidence  that  there  exists  a  con-  Dairymen, Inc.; Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy- refuted  by  evidence  that  there  exists  a  con-
men,  Inc.)  to  determine  whether  dairy  coop- testable  market.  Contestable  market  theory  men,  Inc.)  to  determine  whether  dairy  coop-
shs  tt  te  is  no  m  y p  r w  e  eratives  violated  the  antitrust  monopolization shows that there  is  no monopoly power  where
provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust there exists a threat of entry of other firms.  This  provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
theory thereby offers agricultural  cooperatives,  Act.
which may have  a large market share by reasons  Obstacles  to  entry  and  exit  are  also  major
of the antitrust  immunity provided by the Cap-  determinants  of a  firm's ability to exercise  mo-
per-Volstead  Act,  an argument  to overcome  al-  nopolypower. Except for Kamerschen and Parker
legations  of  a  Sherman  Act  monopolization  and  Conn  researchers  have  implicitly  been
violation.  concerned with the potential  entry and exit of violation.
firms when  measuring welfare  costs  of monop-
Key words: cooperatives,  contestable  markets,  oly  power.  Contestable  market  theory,  devel-
antitrust,  monopoly  oped by Baumol and others,  provides a unifying
theory of market structure based on freedom  of
VWorkable,  as  opposed  to  perfect  competi-  entry and exit.  The  theory implies that market
tion  has  been  employed  by  economists  as  a  share  is  at best  only  a  necessary condition  for
standard  for  judging  real-world  market  condi-  monopoly  power  and,  at  worst,  of  little  im-
tions.  Markham  has  proposed  that  an  industry  portance  in measuring  market  efficiency.
is  workably  competitive  when  dynamic  forces
that determine  market  structure  have been  ex-  The  objective  of this  paper  is  to discuss  the
amined  and  there  are  no  public  policy  alter-  theory of  contestable  markets  and  evaluate  its
natives  that  would  influence  this  market  importance  in the area  of agricultural  cooper-
structure  in  such  a manner  that  social  welfare  atives. Properties of contestable markets are first
increases.  The criteria for judging  such a work-  explained and related to market shares. Previous
ably competitive  market  have been  formulated  research  in market structure  and judicial  inter-
in terms of market structure,  conduct,  and per-  pretations of the monopolization restrictions of
formance  (Sosnick).  the Sherman Antitrust Act  are then investigated
Market  structure  generally  encompasses  the  on  the  basis  of  contestability  theory with  em-
market shares of individual  firms in an industry  phasis  upon  cooperative  monopolization  and
and  firms'  freedom  to  enter  and  exit  the  in-  contestable  markets.
dustry.  Researchers  have  measured  the  market
shares  of various  firms  in  an  industry  as  an  CONTESTABLE  MARKETS
indicator  of workable competition  with the as-
sumption that the higher a firm's  market share,  Perfectly contestable  markets  are  defined  by
the  greater  its potential  monopoly  power.  For  Baumol,  Panzar, and Willig as markets accessible
example,  Scherer  states  that when  the  leading  to  potential  entrants,  with  the  following  two
four  firms  control  40  percent  or  more  of the  properties.  First,  potential  entrants  have  iden-
total  market,  it  is  a  fair  assumption  that  an  tical production technologies and face the same
oligopolistic  market  structure exists.  Although  market  demands  as  incumbent  firms.  This  im-
Scherer  does  state  that  market  share  is  at best  plies  potential entrants  face  no cost barriers to
only  a one dimensional  indicator of monopoly  entry.  There must also be  freedom of exit.  Sec-
power,  this  type  of generalization  may lead  to  ond, potential entrants employ incumbent firms'
the false premise that market share is a sufficient  pre-entry  prices in their decision regarding  en-
criterion  to  measure  a  firm's  divergence  from  try.  Potential  entrants  may  recognize  that  an
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129expansion  of  industry  output  results  in  de-  MC(qi)  <  MC(qj)  for all  qi and  q,  with
pressed  prices.  However,  they  assume  that  if  0  <  qj  <  qi  <  q.
they undercut incumbents' prices, they can mar-
ket  as  much  of the  commodity  as  the  market  These  cost  concepts  are  essential  in the  de-
demands  at their price.  termination of the structure,  conduct,  and per-
Contestable  market  theory is a generalization  formance of an industry. With these cost function
of  the  classical  theory  of  perfect  competition  concepts  and  the  industry  demand  function
with fewer assumptions required to obtain eco-  Q(p),  the  equilibrium  market  structure  of  a
nomic  efficiency.  Unlike  perfect  competition,  single product industry can be determined.  Any
firms  in a  contestable  market may not be  small  equilibrium  industry structure  must satisfy the
or numerous nor produce a homogeneous  prod-  following two  properties:
uct.  Contestable  markets  share  only one  attri-
bute with perfect competition; freedom of entry
and exit.  Thus,  a perfectly  competitive  market  1.  Feasible  Industry Configuration:
is  necessarily  a  contestable  market  but  a  con-  A  feasible  industry  configuration  is  com-
testable market is not necessarily perfectly com-  posed  of  n  firms  respectively  producing
petitive.  Contestability theory thereby, without  the  output  quantities  q,  ... ,  qn  for  sale
modification,  becomes  applicable  to imperfect  at price  p,
competition as well as perfect competition. The
theory takes market structure  to be determined  Y' qi  =  Q(p)  and pqi  - C(qi)  >-  0 endogenously and simultaneously with the level  i=  for i  =  1 . . n.
of industry output and prices. This is in contrast 
to  traditional  analysis  where  the  structure  of
particular  markets  is exogenous  to the analysis  Every  market structure  analysis  at least implic-
of output and price  determination.  itly incorporates this feasibility condition. How-
Pertinent  to the  contestability  theory,  deter-  ever,  for a feasible industry configuration  to be
mination of structure, conduct and performance  in equilibrium  in a contestable market,  it must
of  an  industry  are  three  basic  cost  concepts.  not offer any opportunities for profitable  entry,
These three cost concepts,  in  conjunction with  even when  entry costs are  zero.  Rather it  must
truly free entry and exit, provide an endogenous  satisfy the following property  for a  sustainable
and simultaneous  determination  of the size  and  configuration.
number  of  firms  in  the  industry.  A  brief  dis-
cussion  of  the  relationship  among  these  cost
concepts,  industry  sustainability  and  contesta-  2.  Sustainable  Industry Configuration:
bility is  provided.  For a  detailed  discussion  of  Afeasible  industry configuration with price
these concepts  and formal proof of the follow-  p and firm outputs q.  . , q  is sustainable
ing  contestability  properties,  refer  to  Baumol,  if  pq  c(q)  for  all  p,  '  p  and  qi 
Panzar,  and  Willig.  The  three  basic  cost  con-  Q(Pi)'
cepts  are  as  follows:
This  implies that no potential  entrants  can  ex-
1.  Strict  Subadditivity:  pect  to  earn  positive  pure  profits,  given  the
A cost function c(q)  is strictly subadditive  incumbents'  prices  and outputs.
at q if for any and all quantities of outputs  Output determination,  pricing, and efficiency
q,  ,,  qn;  qi  q;  i  =  ,  . .. ,  n;  in  a  contestable  market  follow  directly  from
n  n  these  two  properties.  A  sustainable  configura-
E  qi  =  q,  c(q)  <  E  c(qi).  tion must minimize the total cost to the industry
i=  1  i=  1  of a given level of industry output. No different
configuration of size distribution, output levels,
A cost function  is  subadditive  at output q  or  production  technologies  for firms  can  pro-
if it  is  more  expensive  for  two  or  more  vide  a given level  of industry output at  a lower
firms  to produce  q than  it  is  for q to be  total  cost than  that incurred  by firms  in  a sus-
produced  by a single  firm.  tainable  configuration.  Intuitively,  this  result
implies that  if there  existed  an alternative  in- 2.  Declining Average  Costs: dustry configuration that could produce the same
Average  c  osts decline  through  output q Average  c  osts  decline  through  output  q  given  level  of output  at a  lower  cost,  at  least
one of those producers would earn positive pure
c(qi)/qi  <  c(q,)/q,  for all qi  and  qj with  profits.  There  would  then  exist  at  least  one
O  Q  <  q  <  qi  ￿  q.  profitable  entry plan for potential entrants.  The
present configuration  is then vulnerable to entry
3.  Declining  Marginal  Costs:  and thus blocked by an alternative configuration
Marginal  costs  decline  through  output  q  until a Nash equilibrium  is obtained where total
if  industry  cost  is  minimized for a  given level  of
130output.l  Furthermore,  this  result  suggests  that  the  smaller  the  number  of  firms  in  a  market,
if two or more  firms  produce positive amounts  the greater will be the divergence between price
of the same commodity in a sustainable industry  and marginal  cost.  The constant threat of entry
configuration,  their  outputs  must be  such  that  ensures that only firms which practice marginal
their  marginal  costs  are  equal.  This  result  is  cost pricing can  be  present  in  long  run multi-
analogous  to multi-plant firms  or the operation  firm  equilibrium.
of cartels where firms attempt to minimize costs.
A  configuration  is  not  sustainable  if total  cost
could  be  reduced  by  a  reallocation  of output  RESEARCH  IMPLICATIONS
to  lower  cost  firms.  Contestable  market  theory  is  of  particular
The  nature  of  equilibrium  pricing  and  effi-  importance in agricultural cooperative  research
ciency in a contestable industry was determined  involving allegations of antitrust violations.  Pre-
by Baumol,  Panzar,  and Willig,  and was shown  vious research in this area has employed market
to  have  the following  two  properties:  shares as a measure of market imperfection with-
out considering  entry and  exit conditions.  For
1.  In any sustainable  industry  configuration,  example,  Parker  and Connor in estimating  con-
sumer  losses  due  to  imperfections  in  the  U.S.
p  >  MC(qi),  i  =  1,  . .. ,  n.  food manufacturing  industries base their analy-
sis on market share.  Contestable  market theory
A  counter  example  provides  a  proof  of  this  indicates  that  market  share  may be  irrelevant
property.  If marginal  cost was greater than price,  in  showing  the  presence  of  monopoly  power
a potential  entrant  could  earn  a  positive  pure  because  of  the  threat  of entry  by other  firms.
profit by employing the same production  tech-  Thereby,  it may be inappropriate to use market
nology with a  small  reduction  in  quantity.  Re-  share as a screening criterion to identify whether
duction in output decreases total cost more than  a cooperative  has violated section  2  of Capper-
the  decrease  in  total  revenue  and  thus  profits  Volstead, as suggested byJesse,Johnson,  Marion,
increase.  and  Manchester.  The  relative  size  of a  cooper-
ative and the market shares  of competing firms
2.  In  a sustainable  industry configuration  in-  may be unimportant and the problems  of com-
volving two  or  more  producing firms,  all  puting  and interpreting  a cooperative's  market
firms must produce outputs at which p  =  share  may be  avoidable.
MC(qi),  and  pq,  =  C(q),  i  =  1,...,  n  Jesse,  Johnson,  Marion,  and Manchester  also
>  2.  advocate  the  use  of  the  concept  of workable
competition in determining if a cooperative  has The previous property prevents price from being  exercised  market power  and unduly enhanced
less than marginal cost in a sustainable  industry  price.  Performance  comparisons  can  be  made
configuration.  To  prove  that  price  cannot  be  between prices in a suspected monopoly power
greater  than  marginal  cost  for  firms  in  an  in-  market  with  prices  in  a  workably  competitive
dustry,  suppose that for firm  qj,  price does  ex-  market. They suggest that the prices of workably
ceed marginal  cost. A profitable  entry plan now  competitive  marets  are  more  appropriate  as
exists  since  a  potential  entrant  can  mimic  the  norms  for  evaluating  price  enhancement  than
production  technology  of this  incumbent  firm  those  of perfect  competition.  The  problem  is
and increase output. This leads to potential pure  to define  an operational  criterion  for judging a
profits  for the entrant.  The  presence  of at least  workably compettiive  market.  For appraisal  as-
two  incument  firms  is  required  for  the  proof  sumptions  of size  and number  of firms  in  the
since  this enables  an entrant to market a higher  industry under  a workably  competitive  model
level  of  output  than  qj  without  a  significant  may be  overly  restrictive.  Contestable  market
reduction  in  market  price.  theory  is  not restricted  by these  assumptions.
Finally,  if total revenue  was less  than a total  Thus,  an appraisal  that  relies  on  the  contesta-
cost,  a  firm  could  not  remain  solvent  in  the  bilityofmarkets  offers a standard against which
long  run  and  the  configuration  would  not  be  actual  markets  can  be  compared  even  though
sustainable.  If  pure profits  existed  (total  reve-  perfect contestability  is not likely to be satisfied
nue  greater  than  cost),  an  entrant  could  un-  by  any real  market.
dercut  incumbents'  prices  and  still  earn  pure
profits.  Thus,  in  a  sustainable  industry  config-  COOPERATIVE  MONOPOLIZATION
uration,  incumbent  firms  must  earn zero  pure
profits  with price equaling  both  marginal  cost  Section  2  of  the  Sherman  Antitrust  Act  de-
and average cost. This result is inconsistent with  dares  that  it  is  unlawful  for  any  person  to
the traditional view dating back to Cournot that  monopolize,  attempt  to  monopolize,  or
1 An  industry is  in Nash  equilibrium  if the strategy  of each player  (firm)  maximizes  the payoff to that player  (firm),  given
the  strategies  of all of the players  (Nash).
131conspire  to monopolize  trade.  This  monopoli-  duct having no legitimate business justification
zation  prohibition  applies  to  agricultural  co-  is not within  the legitimate  objects  of Capper-
operatives  but  the  Capper-Volstead  Act  Volstead  (Maryland and  Virginia Milk  Pro-
constitutes  an affirmative  defense  to  immunize  ducers  Association, Inc. v.  United States; Fair-
some  activities  of qualifying  cooperatives  from  dale Farms I).
antitrust prosecution. The Supreme Court found  Areeda and Turner concluded that a  price at
that  Capper-Volstead  enables  organizations  or above average cost, or at or above reasonably
comprised of persons engaged in the production  anticipated  short run marginal and average var-
of agricultural  products  to engage  in activities  iable  costs,  is not  predatory.  Likewise,  a short
necessary  to accomplish their assigned purpose  run profit-maximizing  price below average  cost
of  effective  farmer  representation  (Maryland  should also be found to be nonpredatory.  How-
and Virginia  Milk Producers  Association, Inc.  ever,  a  price  below  a  firm's  reasonably  antici-
v.  United  States).  The  judiciary  has  labeled  pated short run marginal costs or average variable
these activities  as  "legitimate  objects"  permis-  costs is predatory.  Under this hypothesis, unless
sible  by reason  of Capper-Volstead.  a  cooperative's  price  is  less  than  its  marginal
Although  the  major trust  of Capper-Volstead  cost, there is  no predatory pricing to constitute
was  to  immunize  cooperative  price-fixing  ac-  a monopolization  violation under  Section  2  of
tivities from prosecution under Section  1 of the  the Sherman  Act.
Sherman  Act,  the  courts  have  found  other  ac-  Recently,  structure and performance  have re-
tivities  to  be  within  the  legitimate  objects  of  ceived increased  attention  as  appropriate  con-
Capper-Volstead.  Recently,  some  courts  have  cepts  for  analyzing  cooperative  antitrust
interpreted  the  legitimate  objects  permissible  violations  (O'Hara;Kaplin;  andJesse,Johnson,
under Capper-Volstead  to include activities  that  Marion,  and Manchester).  Courts also appear to
constitute  a  Sherman  Act  Section  2  monopoli-  be  reducing  their  dependence  upon  conduct
zation  violation,2 such  as  monopolization  ac-  and accepting arguments  based upon structure
tivities  of  fixing  prices,  joining  together  with  and performance.  Three recent cooperative  an-
other  cooperatives,  and  obtaining  a  monopoly  ticompetitive  federal  court  decisions,  United
through  the voluntary  enrollment  of members  States  v.  Dairymen,  Inc.,  Alexander  v.  Na-
of  a  voluntary  combination  with  another  co-  tional  Farmers Organization,  and  Kinnett
operative (Fairdale  Farms I). At the same time,  Dairies,  Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., adopted market
any  monopolization  activity  that is  not within  share  as  a  criterion  to  be  employed  in  deter-
the legitimate  objects of cooperatives  is a non-  mining  whether  there  was  a  Sherman  Act  mo-
exempted  activity  that  would  subject  the  co-  nopolization  violation.  The  Alexander  court
operative to prosecution under Section  2 of the  noted  that  actual  monopolization  requires  a
Sherman  Act  (id.; Fairdale  Farms II;  Kinnett  showing  of  monopoly  power  in  the  relevant
Dairies, Inc.  v.  Dairymen, Inc.).  product  and geographic  market,  while  a  mini-
mal showing of product and geographic context
In addition,  Section  2  of Capper-Volstead  of-  is  required  for  an  alleged  conspiracy  to  mo-
fers  a  check  on cooperative  activities  that  un-  nopolize.  The  court did not need to rely  on a
duly enhance the price of an agricultural product  market share evaluation for its decision because
through  monopolizing  or  restraining  trade  in  it found  that  three  of the  defendant  dairy  co-
interstate  or  foreign  commerce.  The  Secretary  operatives  had  engaged  in  predatory  conduct
of Agriculture  is required to initiate a complaint  that was  clearly not  mmunized by Capper-Vol-
against  such  activities.  However,  no  secretary  stead.
has  used  this provision. has  used  this  provision.  The  cooperative  in  Dairymen was  charged
O'Hara  notes  that  arguments  concerning  an-  with  attempted  monopolization;  the  coopera-
titrust  monopolization  show  a  dichotomy  be-  tive  had explicitly intended to achieve the un-
tween  a  focus  on  conduct,  the  judicially  lawful goal of monopoly power. The court stated
preferred  criterion,  and structure  and perform-  the standard test for attempted monopolization
ance  criteria favored  by  economists.  Cases  in-  as being anticompetitive conduct with a specific
terpreting  the  antitrust  laws  governing  intent  to  monopolize  and  a  dangerous  proba-
cooperatives  show courts  adopting  conduct  as  bility of success. An intent to monopolize could
a determinant  of activities  that are illegal.  Con-  exist  even  if there was  economic  justification
duct,  such  as  predatory  pricing  through  pool-  if the anticompetitive  practice  was  undertaken
loading,  is  not  within  the  legitimate  objects  in  the  desire  to  achieve  an  unlawful  goal.  A
immunized  by the  Capper-Volstead  Act.  Thus,  dangerous  probability  of success  of achieving
courts  have  routinely  held that  predatory  con-  monopoly  power  in  violation  of Section  2  of
2 The  circuit  courts  are  not  in agreement  as  to the applicability  of the  Capper-Volstead  affirmative  defense to allegations
of a  Section 2  Sherman Antitrust violation.  The  Supreme Court declined to  grant a writ of certiorari  in  Fairdale  Farms I and
II  to  consider  this issue,  but may  decide  to  address the  issue  by accepting  certiorari  in L. & L. Howell,  Inc.  v. Cincinnati
Cooperative  Milk  Sales Association,  1983-2  Trade Case  ¶  65,595  (6th  Cir.  1983).
132the  Sherman  Act  could be  evaluated  by  exam-  nonqualifying  organizations.  There  also  exist a
ining the cooperative's market share within rel-  complex  set  of government  marketing  regula-
evant geographic submarkets. The cause of action  tions  and  excess  milk  production.  These  cir-
was remanded to the district court to determine  cumstances markedly alter the structure of many
the relevant  geographic  submarkets.  milk  markets.
Thus,  Dairymen says  that  market  share  in  Market  conditions  for  fluid  milk imply  that,
relevant geographic submarkets  may be used to  relative  to existing  suppliers,  a  new milk sup-
show a  Sherman violation of an attempt  to mo-  plier  is  not at  a  disadvantage  in terms  of pro-
nopolize.  Although  the  circuit  court  did  not  duction  technique  or  product  quality.  A  milk
directly  connect  market  share  with the  coop-  supplier may also have relative freedom of entry
erative's  unlawful  goal,  their  relationship  is  and  exit  to  a  given  market.  Freedom  of  entry
mandated  by the  proof requirements  of an  at-  exists by reason  that  a hauler  or  supplier  may
tempted  monopolization  violation.  There  must  have excess  capacity  that could be utilized  by
be  a  specific  intent  of  achieving  monopoly  expanding  into  a  new area.  The  pooling,  mar-
power.  The  only  proof reported  by  the  court  keting,  and  pricing  arrangements  available  to
in Dairymen that is  responsive to the element  cooperatives  also  may  provide  for  relatively
of  monopoly  power  was  evidence  of the  co-  costless entry into  a  new market.
operative's market share in relevant geographic
submarkets.  Two  examples  from  recent  monopolization
sba  rketsict  ^on.  . . .litigation  enumerate  this point.  In Alexander,
The  district  court  in  Kinnett Dairies con-  Mid-America  Dairymen,  Inc.  (Mid-Am)  and  As-
anud  foun  that  the  posssion  of  a  dominant  conclusthat  mart  hat  at  the  termination  of
share of thae  availablre  wsmilnsociated  Milk Producas  pers,  Inc.  (AMPI),  two  largen missiblcatounder  ofeCapper-Volstead  marketing  its  own  milk  in  thosefor  areas  where
monopolization  since none  of the cooperative's  ac  d  ad  od  m  h  entr  od
tions  were predatory.  not  involve  significant  costs.  In  Green  v.  AMPs-
~~~the~~sociated  MiShermas, Inc., the  court  lnoted  at the  co-
MONOPOLIZATION  AND  CONTESTABLE  the purchase of a  markilk  route  to enable certain
MARKETS  existing customers of the milk hauler to change
Am  milk  in other  areas.  This  arrangement  sup-
The courts are correct in finding that an analy-  e  er  tion  of
share of the available milk production was  per-  prt  acoluintaatheernto
missible under the scope of the Capper-Volstead  their agreement  Mid-Am  could esily commenc
of a  Sherman  Act  Secone  of  the  co  opolizative's  ac-m  u  w  i  ur  any  e-
tions.were  redatory.  Mid-Am  had sold AMPI milk. Thus, entry would
violation  is  generally  dependent  upon  some  ditional  costs.
ishowng  pnot  in  of a rsignificant  costs.  In  Green  . s  does
not  mahwvrhtafimsmrehrvsociated  Milk Producers,  hwInc.,  thg,  marketing,  and  pric-
is  conclusive  evidence  of  NTESTBLE  the  existence  of mo-  ing arrangemen  milkay  route  to  enable ertain
MARKETS  existing customers of the milk hauler to change
nopoly power. As  suggested by Baumol,  market  of exit.  The  is  previouslce thereby  notabled  Mid-A  consign-
share  courtsmay  be  re corrlevant  to  the  presence  of mo-  menthat  agreement  demonstrates  this  possibility.
nopoly powf  a Sher, buAct  is not necestion  2  monoleasure  At  cortie  t  nsignment agreement,  Mid-
of that  power.  A  cursory  analysis  of the  milk  Am  shwithould  be  able  to stop supplying  AMPI  its showmarketing  of a  requisities  of  the  cooperatives  in  milk  shareby  exit from that marketithout
Dairymen, Alexander,  that  a  firm's marke  sug-  incurring anbility  costs.  Exitpooling  marketing,  and  pri-even
gests  conclusthat  the theory of contestable  nce of mo-  ing  arrangements  may  aler  cost  saprovings.  If a  cooperative  incurs  reg-
offer  an  insight  into  whether  the  cooperatives  ulatory taxes for interhandler shipments of milk
had  monopoy power.  As suggested by Baumol, market  of exit. The previously  noted Mid-Am  consign-atory
share  may  of our  couelevantry's  milk markets  have  an  paymo-  ment  agreement  from  a  market  that  terminated
nopoly power, but it is not necessarily a measure  At the end of the consignment agreement,  Mid-
unusuof  that  power.  A  cursory  analysis  of the  mlk  Am  sh  ould  be able  to  stop  supply  (Kinnett Dair-  its
islative  provisions  which  govern  marketing  ar-  ies).
rangements  and  strategy.  Largof  th  e  cooperativ  es  in  milk  arrangements  suggestfrom  that  a  firm witho
Dairymen, Alexander  and Kinnet Dairies  sug-  incurring any costs.  Exiting a  market may even
gests that the theory of contestable markets may  offer  cost savings.  If a cooperative  incurs  reg-
offer  anizations  qualifinto  whether  the  Capper-Vol-  an excess  or  interhandler  supply  hipments  of milk may be able
stead  exemption  market  over 60 percent of our  to enter or leave  certain  milk markets without
country's  dairy products  (U.S.  Governe  an  payment.  Thus,  selectedfrom  a  markets of the  minated
unusual  structure  because  of the unique  leg-  these taxes would reduce  costs (Kinnett Dair-
islative  provisions which  govern  marketing  ar-  ies).
rangements  and  strategy.  Large  cooperative  These arrangements  suggest that  a firm with
organizations qualifying under the Capper-Vol-  an excess or deficit  supply of milk may be able
stead exemption market over 60 percent of our  to enter or leave certain  milk markets without
country's dairy products  (U.S.  Government Ac-  impediment. Thus, selected markets of the milk
counting  Office).  Capper-Volstead  allows these  hauling and supply industry may be vulnerable
business  organizations  to enter  into  nonpreda-  to  hit-and-run  entry  and  thus  be  close  to  a
tory  pooling  arrangements,  supply  and  con-  perfectly contestable market. The degree of con-
signment  contracts and price-fixing  agreements  testability  is,  of course,  an  empirical  question. 
that  are  precluded  by  the  antitrust  laws  for  However,  if these conditions had characterized
133the  markets  at  issue  in  Dairymen and  Alex-  listic activities by reason of the Capper-Volstead
ander, each cooperative's  market  share  would  affirmative  defense.  This  is  because  the theory
have  been  immaterial.  The  welfare  properties  offers a procedure  to  determine  whether a firm
of  a  contestable  market  mean  that  there  is  no  has monopoly power,  a required  condition  for
monopoly power. Since monopoly power is the  an  actual  and  attempted  monopolization  vio-
crux  of  a  Sherman  monopolization  violation,  lation.
the  existence  of  the  properties  of  a  perfectly  Courts  have  suggested  that  a  large  market
contestable  market precludes  a finding of such  share  may  constitute  an  unlawful  goal  or may
a  violation.  demonstrate  monopoly  power.  The  theory  of
In Alexander, the high overhead  costs of the  contestable  markets  offers  evidence  to  counter
existing  milk  suppliers  constituted  an  ineffi-  the  assumption  that  a  firm's  market  share  is
ciency that  resulted in  the  price  of their  milk  sufficient to prove  a  monopolization  violation.
being greater than the marginal costs associated  A  Sherman  Act  Section  2  actual  or  attempted
with efficient production. This situation allowed  monopolization  violation  requires  substantia-
the  National Farmers  Organization  to enter the  tion of the existence  of monopoly power or the
market and price its milk at marginal cost, which  dangerous  probability  of  success  of achieving
was lower than the price of existing firms.  Rather  such  power.  In a perfectly contestable  market,
than reducing  their  overhead  costs  in  order to  the  market  is  open to  competition  so  there  is
make themselves  competitive with the National  no monopoly  power.
Farmers Organization, the existing firms adopted  An allegation that a cooperative's large market
practices  including  supply  shorting  and  late  share  constitutes  monopoly  power  may be  re-
deliveries,  discriminatory  pricing,  coercive  futed by showing a threat of entry of other firms
threats  of  supply  cutoffs,  committed  supply  with evidence  establishing the major properties
agreements,  and  threats  of  litigation.  These  of  contestable  markets.  The  evidence  would
predatory  activities  were  designed  to  prevent  show a  market accessible  to potential freedom
the  National  Farmers  Organization  from  sup-  to  exist.  Such  evidence  means  that  the  coop-
plying milk at marginal cost. If permitted, these  erative  could  not  use  its  market  position  to
activities  would have resulted in prices greater  control  prices  or  stifle  competition.  Thus,  the
than  marginal  cost  and  would  have  destroyed  cooperative  does  not possess monopoly power
the  contestability  of the market.  as  required for an actual  or attempted  monop-
Because  the  predatory  conduct  was  illegal  olization violation.
under  the  Sherman  Act,  the  Alexander court  CASES
did  not need  to  consider further  the  concepts
of structure  and  performance  in  order  to  de-  n  tion  Farmer  Organiz
termine  whether  there  was  monopoly  power.3  (8th  Cir.  1982).
Had  the  court  continued,  however,  the  con-  Fairdale  Farms, Inc.  v.  Yankee  Milk  Inc., Had  the  court6continued,  however,  the  con-
testable market theory may have shown that the  635  F2d  1037  (2d  Cir.  180),  cert.  denied,
existing  firms  did  not  have  monopoly  power  454  U.S.  818  (1981)  (Fairdale  Farms I).
The National  Farmers  Organization  was  able to  Fairdale  Farms, Inc.  v.  Yankee  Milk,  Inc.,
enter various milk supply markets and  success-  715 F.2d 30  (2nd  Cir.  1983),  cert. denied, 104
fully compete with the existing milk suppliers  S.Ct.  711  (1984)  (Fairdale  Farms II).
*Green  . Associated  C  Milk  Producers  Inc. despite their overwhelming share of the market.d  Mlk  Producers, Inc.,
Thus,  the  milk  supply  markets  were  open  to  692  F.2d  1153  (8th  Cir.  1982).
competition.  It follows  that  there  was  no  mo-  Kinnett Dairies,  Inc.  v. Dairymen, Inc., 512
nopoly power  as  required  for  a  Section  2  mo-  F.  Supp.  608  (M.D.  Ga.  1981),  aff'd,  715  F.2d
nopolization  violation.  520  (11th  Cir.  1983).
L.  &  L.  Howell, Inc.  v.  Cincinnati Cooper-
rTTCONCLUSION  ative Milk Sales Association, 716 F.2d 903  (6th
Cir.  1983),  1983-2  Trade  Case  ¶ 65,595,  cert.
Contestable  market theory not only provides  pending.
a unifying  analysis  of market structure but also  Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers  As-
extends  Adam  Smith's  invisible  hand  into  im-  sociation, Inc. v.  United States,  362  U.S.  458
perfect  competition.  The  theory  may be  espe-  (1960).
cially  important  for  agricultural  cooperatives  United States  v.  Dairymen, Inc.,  660  F.2d
which  are  able  to  engage  in  certain  monopo-  192  (6th  Cir.  1981).
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